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ABSTRACT  
   
Very little experimental work has been done to investigate the 
psychological underpinnings of perceptions of privacy. This issue is especially 
pressing with the advent of powerful and inexpensive technologies that allow 
access to all but our most private thoughts -and these too are at risk (Farah, Smith, 
Gawuga, Lindsell, &Foster;, 2009). Recently the Supreme  Court ruled that the 
use of a global positioning system (GPS) device to covertly follow a criminal 
suspect, without first obtaining a search warrant, is a violation of a suspect's 
fourth amendment right to protection from unlawful search and seizure (United 
States v. Jones, 2012). However, the Court has also ruled in the past that a law 
enforcement officer can covertly follow a suspect's vehicle and collect the same 
information without a search warrant and this is not considered a violation of the 
suspect's rights (Katz v. United States). In the case of GPS surveillance the 
Supreme Court Justices did not agree on whether the GPS device constituted a 
trespassing violation because it was placed on the suspect's vehicle (the majority) 
or if it violated a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. This incongruence is 
an example of how the absence of a clear and predictable model of privacy makes 
it difficult for even the country's highest moral authority to articulate when and 
why privacy has been violated. This research investigated whether public 
perceptions of support for the use of each surveillance technique also vary across 
different monitoring types that collect the same information and whether these 
differences are mediated by similar factors as argued by the Supreme Court. 
Results suggest that under some circumstances participants do demonstrate 
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differential support and this is mediated by a general privacy concern. However, 
under other circumstances differential support is the result of an interaction 
between the type of monitoring and its cost to employ -not simply type; this 
differential support was mediated by both perceived violations of private-space 
and general privacy. Results are discussed in terms of how these findings might 
contribute to understanding the psychological foundation of perceived privacy 
violations and how they might inform policy decision. 
  iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
   
I would like to thank my husband Thomas, for his blind faith in everything I do, 
his steadfast encouragement for all that matters to me, and his unbounded 
witticisms that keep me moving. I would also like to my express my sincere 
gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Nick Schweitzer for the countless hours he has 
devoted to this and many other projects I have done. His ardent and unwavering 
dedication to my success and his inexhaustible intellect are deeply cherished. I 
would also like to warmly thank Dr. Evan Risko, who’s creative and optimistic 
approach to science is inspiring and whose help and guidance are invaluable. 
Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Matt Newman, not only for being on my 
committee, but also for waiting patiently and being so flexible.
  iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
          Page 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... v  
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... vi  
CHAPTER 
1    INTRODUCTION .................................................................................  1  
2    EXPERIMENT 1 .................................................................................  11  
Method .............................................................................................. 12  
Results ............................................................................................... 14 
Discussion 1 ...................................................................................... 19  
3    EXPERIMENT 2 .................................................................................  21  
Method  ............................................................................................. 21  
Results  .............................................................................................. 24 
Discussion 2 ...................................................................................... 27  
4  GENERAL DISCUSSION ....................................................................  29 
REFERENCES  ........................................................................................................  35 
APPENDIX  
A      EXPERIMENT 1 – SCENARIO  .....................................................  38  
B      QUESTIONS EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2 ..........................................  40 
C      EXPERIMENT 2 – SCENARIO ......................................................  42 
 
 
  v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1.       Structure Matrix for Privacy and Effectiveness (1) .............................  16 
2.       Structure Matrix for Privacy and Effectiveness (2) .............................  26 
  vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1.       Mediation model comparing Support for Police vs. GPS through 
Privacy and Effectiveness ................................................................... 17 
2.       Mediation model comparing Support for Police vs. Drones through 
Privacy and Effectiveness  .................................................................  18 
3.       Weak interaction of Type by Cost on Support ....................................  25 
  1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no clear consensus on what the definition of “privacy” should be, 
though many legal and philosophical scholars have attempted to define it (Parent, 
1983; Parker, 1973; Otterburg, 2004; Suslak, 2011; Nissenbaum, 1998). The 
absence of a clear definition is particularly problematic in the United States, not 
only because this leaves our legal system responsible for resolving privacy 
protection issues without knowing specifically what should be considered private, 
but also because our penchants for newer, better, and cheaper forms of 
information technologies almost inevitably result in new ways, whether 
intentionally or not, of accessing information that, prior to, was intuitively 
considered “private.” As each new perceived threat to privacy is brought before 
the legal system, law makers must redefine what information should be legally 
protected and what should be considered public domain -and why it should be so. 
In terms of moving to a more predictive model of privacy protection, rather than 
the backward-looking process that exists today, understanding “why” is key in 
determining “what.” Recently, in an attempt to make defining privacy more 
practical, experimental researchers have begun to attempt to identify the 
mechanism or mechanisms by which privacy decisions are made (Baker, 
Schweitzer, Risko, submitted). Being able to recognize what mediates privacy 
decisions under a variety of circumstances would be invaluable to the legal 
system in terms of being able to create policies that accurately consider 
underlying public interests.  
  2 
Significant privacy issues that arise from the government’s use of 
technology to collect information about its citizens generally arrive at the 
Supreme Court arguing for protection under the fourth amendment which 
provides citizens protection against unreasonable search and seizure (Otterburg, 
2004; Parker, 1973). It is up to the individual Supreme Court justices to decide 
what is and is not considered private, and often when these decision are made, 
even when a unanimous decision in terms of end outcome is reached, they are 
justified for different reasons (Thrifty-Tel, Inc v. Bezenek, 1996; United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno, 2010; United States v. Jones, 2012). As technology allows a 
wider range of information to be monitored by many parties including the 
government (such as long range video surveillance, genetic information, social 
media interactions, internet history usage, etc.) each new attempt to use such 
information to identify illegal activity inevitably becomes scrutinized as a 
potential privacy violation The changing nature of technology and the short-
sighted ways in which privacy is defined make it difficult for existing rulings to 
be applied across multiple technologies.   
One particular example of a technological advance in surveillance that 
outpaces privacy policies is the unprecedented ability to record and transmit a 
detailed and persistent stream of information about a person’s geographical 
location, which quickly presented unaddressed legal concerns about threats to 
privacy (Ackerman, 2012; Nissenbaum, 1998). The extent of these threats was 
and still is not universally agreed upon (Otterburg, 2004; Totenberg, 2011; 
Friedman, 2012), resulting in inconsistent policy decisions about the use of this 
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technology (United States v. Jones, 2012; United States v Pineda-Moreno, 2010). 
The constitutionality of using this type of technology, specifically the use of a 
global positioning system device or receiver (GPS), to covertly track criminal 
suspects has been debated in both State and Federal courts and by legal scholars 
and philosophers (United States v. Jones, 2012; United States v Pineda-Moreno, 
2010; United States v. Robinson, 2011; Suslak, 2011; Otterburg, 2004; Friedman, 
2012, Shah, 2009). The arguments fall not on whether law enforcement officers 
(LEO’s) can use GPS technology in general, but specifically whether they can do 
so without first obtaining a search warrant. The argument has been essentially put 
to rest with the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision (United States v. Jones, 2012) 
declaring that a GPS device may no longer be covertly placed on a suspect’s 
vehicle without first obtaining a valid search warrant, citing that this would be a 
violation of the suspect’s fourth amendment rights. The Supreme Court justices 
reached a unanimous decision in this case, however they were split five to four as 
to why the decision should have been made and argued two different precedents 
were argued to each be the more relevant that the other in terms of  which one to 
base the ruling. When stepping back to consider relevant aspects of the nature of 
the information being protected (i.e details information about a suspect’s vehicle 
location) it presents as an interesting example of the ambiguity of privacy 
policies, for if this same type of covert surveillance is conducted without a search 
warrant, but carried out by an LEO in an undercover vehicle, no such privacy 
violation occurs. In other words, a law enforcement officer can surreptitiously 
follow a suspect’s vehicle and record detailed information about the vehicle’s 
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location for any continuous period of time (referred to here as “tailing”) without a 
search warrant, but this same information obtained through the use of a GPS 
device without a search warrant is unconstitutional. The case of United States v. 
Jones (2012) demonstrates that in terms of privacy, law makers do not 
consistently agree on how and why privacy decisions should be made. As the 
legal system continues to grapple with constructing a framework to guide the 
legal use of covert surveillance with respect to the fourth amendment, little 
attention has been dedicated to understanding public perceptions of such 
surveillance techniques or the mechanisms that guide these decisions as a means 
to understanding the nature of privacy itself. To that end, this research will not 
attempt to directly define privacy, but will instead 1) investigate if the public also 
perceives an intuitive difference between types of monitoring that collect similar 
information, and 2) investigate if those perceptions are mediated by factors that 
echo the arguments presented in United States v. Jones (2012). 
Law Enforcement Surveillance 
Law enforcement agencies often rely on covert surveillance to collect 
information about a criminal suspect in order to gather evidence for an 
investigation (Marx, 1989; Shah, 2009). This type of surveillance can be 
accomplished a number of ways that range from mundane to highly complex; 
from collecting documents, to following a shoplifter through a store, to setting up 
intricate and lengthy stake-outs. In some cases, monitoring the location of a 
suspect’s vehicle can be a fundamental part of an investigation. Methods 
employed to conduct this type of surveillance can consist of using undercover 
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LEO’s to follow a suspect’s vehicle in unmarked cars while keeping the suspect 
vehicle in view, or by using a radio frequency tracking device (RF tracker) placed 
surreptitiously in a suspect’s possession to track the suspect vehicle from a short 
distance without being in view of the vehicle (Marx, 1989; Shah, 2009, United 
States v. Knotts). In both cases the agency can record detailed information about 
the vehicle’s location at all times during the surveillance period and, so long as 
the vehicle remains in public view, these agencies can utilize either method 
without first obtaining a search warrant (United States v. Karo). Since the early 
2000’s however, law enforcement agencies have had increased access to GPS 
tracking devices as an alternate form of covert surveillance. Originally designed 
for military navigation in the late 70’s, the global position system as a whole 
became available for public use in 1996 when President Clinton declared the 
network to be reclassified as a “dual-use,” program (McLeod, 2008) opening the 
GPS market to civilians. Since 1996, GPS devices have steadily declined in price 
and increased in accuracy, making them an inexpensive and effective technology 
freely available to both governmental and private entities (Economist, 2007; Shah, 
2009). Law enforcement can attach a GPS device covertly to the suspect’s vehicle 
and gather detailed information about the suspect’s vehicle location as with 
previously mentioned form of surveillance; however an LEO can track this 
information from a police station or other remote location rather than necessarily 
maintaining close proximity to the suspect vehicle. The GPS device is appealing 
to law enforcement agencies because it enhances officer safety by removing 
LEO’s from the street, it is effectively inescapable unless there is a malfunction or 
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the device is discovered and removed, and it is relatively inexpensive (Eckholm, 
2012).  In addition to GPS devices, some law enforcement agencies are piloting a 
form of surveillance that would provide both vehicle location data and visual data 
through the use of low flying, unmanned aircraft (often referred to as aerial 
drones) equipped with high resolution cameras and GPS technology (BBC News, 
2012). While RF trackers, tailing, and GPS devices can collect similar 
information, they are not created equal in terms of their constitutionality; the 
admissibility of warrantless drone surveillance has yet to be argued at the 
Supreme Court level. The legal precedents used in the Supreme Court’s decision 
to differentiate GPS monitoring from the other forms mentioned here is distinctly 
divided among the nine Supreme Court Justices and it is this difference in opinion 
that is uniquely interesting in terms of perceptions of privacy violations.   
Divided Legal Opinion 
In January, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously 
concluded that attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle to monitor the 
vehicles location, in absence of a search warrant, violates a suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment rights (United States v. Jones). The majority opinion delivered by 
Justice Scalia, was that the placement of the device was unconstitutional on the 
grounds that the attachment of the device to the vehicle constituted trespassing. 
However, four Justices argued that the information the GPS collected constituted 
a search and that the search ultimately violated a more relevant precedent of the 
suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Sotomayor explained that 
while the trespassing did take place, this alone did not sufficiently address 
  7 
reasonable expectations of privacy, noting that a GPS device would gather and 
record detailed information not necessarily related to the case and would 
ultimately provide information about the suspect’s self-identity. Sotomayor also 
noted that GPS technology may pose a unique potential for abuse because it is 
“relatively easy and cheap” (United States v. Jones), abuse that would threaten the 
goal of the Fourth Amendment to protect citizens from pervasive government 
surveillance. While Scalia addressed a more concrete basis that can be compared 
conventionally to police tailing or drone use, Sotomayor points to a subjective 
rationale that is less clear in terms of how it differentiates between say police 
tailing or RF tracking (Otterberg, 2004). Whether the public perceives GPS 
tracking or similar emerging technologies (such as drones) as fundamentally 
different from police tailing, in terms of potential privacy violations, has not been 
investigated. As such, if a differentiation does exists whether the basis for that 
perception would be grounded in some sort of private-space violation, such as 
trespassing, or in something more broadly defined as one’s “subjective right to 
privacy,” has also been left unexamined. 
Trespass vs Search 
An inclusive description of trespassing is any unlawful interference that 
obstructs the individual or the individual’s property (Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 
1996). This definition could also be conceptualized as an invasion of personal 
and/or physical space. It seems reasonable to expect that if a particular form of 
monitoring were classified as trespassing, it would also be an intrusion of the 
suspect’s personal and/or physical space. 
  8 
A search has been defined in legal terms as occurring when “the 
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable” (Smith v Maryland, 1979; Katz v. United States, 1967). This 
definition obviously poses a complex problem in terms of measurability, implying 
that the only honest way to define something as legitimately violating a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy is to conduct a survey. In practice, this is not 
how Fourth Amendment violations of unlawful search are decided, and if it were, 
it would still offer little insight into what mechanisms those expectation were 
constructed by. Nonetheless, understanding if it is this subjective expectation of 
privacy that most concerns the public about surveillance, rather than a private-
space violation, will at the very least reinforce the need for researchers to identify 
the specific mechanisms that can predict when an unlawful search would occur or 
a violation of  one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”, an understanding which 
could then be applied in future cases involving emerging surveillance 
technologies that will undoubtedly pose similar perceived threats to these 
expectations of privacy (Bilton, 2012).  
Summary 
The vast majority of research regarding privacy violation and GPS 
surveillance has focused on the philosophical and legal aspects of how the 
technology should be employed by government agencies (Nissenbaum,1998; 
Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; Parent, 1983; Parker, 1973). Research has not, 
however, investigated public perceptions of GPS and other forms of covert 
surveillance in attempt to identify what grounds potential privacy concerns in this 
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area. Although perceptions of privacy are highly subjective (e.g cultural norms 
may cause differences), prone to unpredictability (e.g. people may freely share 
information in one situation, but consider this same information secret in another) 
and have high variability (e.g. privacy expectation may change over time), this 
research will investigate, in particular, whether public privacy concerns about 
covert surveillance echo those of Justice Scalia in terms of a private-space 
violation or those of Justice Sotomayor in terms of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. By comparing support for the use of different modes of surveillance that 
ostensibly collect similar information, perceived privacy violation and perceived 
private-space violations can be compared as potential mediators. By manipulating 
factors surrounding the circumstances of the surveillance such as cost and 
effectiveness, any changes in subjective privacy concerns can also be identified. 
This is important because, although policy decisions are sometimes made contrary 
to public opinion, it is nonetheless valuable to be aware of those perceptions, and 
the underlying factors that motivate them, to make decision that consider public 
interest more accurately in the future. 
Three forms of monitoring will be used for comparison: An attached 
monitoring device (e.g. GPS); Law enforcement officers (tailing); and an 
unattached tracking device (e.g. aerial drone). These three modalities are 
considered for two primary reasons: To investigate if variations in public support 
corresponds to variations in Supreme Court’s decision and to provide variability 
in physical location of the tracking devices (i.e. GPS physically touches the 
suspect vehicle, LEO tailing is not touching the vehicle, but is within normal 
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human visual field, and a drone is relatively much farther away than both GPS 
and tailing). In addition, investigating support and privacy perceptions of an 
emerging technology that has not yet been tested in the Supreme court - such as 
aerial drones- adds value by potentially providing insight into public perception 
before a policy decision is made. The first experiment will investigate whether the 
three forms of monitoring, when conducted without a warrant are differentially 
supported and whether that differentiation is mediated by perceived violations of 
private-space (which would implicate concerns about trespassing as articulate by 
Justice Scalia) and/or perceived as a violation of the suspect’s and the 
participant’s privacy (which would implicate concerns about an unlawful search 
as articulate by Justice Sotomayor). The second experiment will then expand on 
and refine the first by systematically manipulating characteristics of the tracking 
technologies that may also impact judgments of support, including relative cost 
and the effectiveness of the monitoring type. In addition to investigating 
judgments of support across these manipulations, this second experiment also 
investigated the effect these manipulations may have on those potential mediators. 




The first experiment investigates whether participants differentially 
support the use of three forms of warrantless tracking techniques. This experiment 
also investigates if these differentiations are mediated by perceived violation of 
private-space and/or perceived violation of general privacy. Should a 
differentiation be mediated only by concerns about private-space violations, we 
would predict that general privacy concerns would not predict differential support 
and might infer that the public is most concerned about the trespassing aspect of 
these surveillance techniques. Conversely, should a differentiation be mediated by 
concerns about only general privacy violations, we would predict that concerns 
about violations of private-space would not predict differential support and thus 
we might infer that the public is most concerned about a violation of one’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to these surveillance techniques. If 
both private-space and general privacy violations mediate a differentiation in 
terms of support for the monitoring type this would indicate that concerns raised 
by both Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor (United States v. Jones, 2012) 
represent public perceptions in this case. In consideration of this possibility the 
experiment will also investigate whether perceptions of effectiveness may 
potentially mediate differential support for the three monitoring types. 
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Method 
Participants. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) a demographically 
diverse sample of US residents age 18 years or older was recruited to participate 
in an online experiment for modest compensation (Rand, 2012; Burhmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) 1. Participants 
gained access to the research through AMT’s website, this in turn redirected them 
to an online-experiment conducted using LimeSurvey which is an open-source 
on-line survey application hosted through ASU virtual servers. A total of 255 
responses were received. Consistent with earlier research using similar materials 
(Schweitzer, Lovis-McMahon, & Baker, submitted; Schweitzer et al., 2011) 
participant responses were excluded for completing the experiment in less than 60 
seconds, participants were also excluded for excessive missing data, and for 
failing a two question manipulation check (those who received a zero and those 
who were unable to answer the question asking them to identify the monitoring 
type they had just read about were categorized as a fail). The final sample 
excluded 29 responses or 10.7% of the original sample, leaving a total 226 
participants of which 54.6% were females, the mean age was 34, and 49.9% held 
at least a four-year college degree. 
Materials/Procedure. Participants were instructed that they would be 
reading a short scenario, and that it was important they take the time to 
                                                
1	  The final screen of the survey directed participants back to MT to claim 
compensation of $1.00 which was consistent with surveys of similar length 
available through AMT.	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understand it. They were also told that they would be answering a series of 
questions specific to that scenario.  
The scenarios asked participants to imagine that the “Association of Police 
Chiefs” was considering the use of a particular monitoring type to follow suspects 
and gather information that could lead to an arrest. Using a between-subjects 
design, each participant was randomly assigned to a scenario with one of three 
monitoring types. In the GPS condition the GPS device was described as being 
covertly placed under a suspect’s car. In the aerial Drone condition the Drone was 
described covertly tracking the suspect from the air. Finally, in the Police tailing 
condition the officers were described as covertly following the suspect using 
undercover cars.  
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate whether 
they would support the use of the monitoring technology if it were proposed in 
their state. In this first experiment support was measured as a dichotomous (yes or 
no) dependent variable, similar to how citizen would express support in a 
referendum or election. However, rather than rely on this single measure of the 
dependent variable of support, participants were subsequently presented with a 
series of thirteen questions, of which three items asked about other aspects of 
support. Additional items measured perceptions of  personal space violations, 
general privacy violations of both the suspect and the participant, and 
effectiveness. Participants provided responses using a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from “not at all” to “very” judging the extent to which the participant believed 
their monitoring type would, for example, “…be a violation of the suspect’s 
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personal space,” “…constitute a violation of the suspect's privacy,” “help 
catch/apprehend criminals.”(See Appendix B for full list of questions). To ensure 
participants attended to the materials, the following screen presented a 
manipulation check asking participants to identify the monitoring type in their 
scenario and the stated purpose of the proposed monitoring technique. Finally, 
basic demographic information was also collected and upon completion 
participants were directed back to AMT to receive their compensation 
 
Results 
To test the hypothesis regarding differential support for warrantless 
tracking modalities, rather than simply using the single dichotomous response to 
the support questions, a maximum likelihood factor analysis with promax rotation 
was performed using the additional support items (see Appendix B, items 2-4) to 
determine if a more robust measure of support could be created. From this 
analysis one factor emerged explaining 82.5% of the variance therefore the four 
items were converted into a standardized factor score, which was labeled Support. 
A one-way, between subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) compared Support 
scores between the three monitoring types. A significant difference between 
monitoring modalities in terms of Support was found, F(2,220)=6.276, p=.002, 
η2=.054. Tukey’s post-hoc tests of the three monitoring types indicated that 
participants were significantly more supportive of Police than Drones (M=.305, 
M=-.251, p=.002) and were approaching significantly greater support for Police 
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over GPS (M=.305, M=-.046, p=.066). No significant difference in Support 
between GPS and Drones was found (p=.387). 
 To investigate if a private-space violation might mediate the relation 
between Type and Support a one-way ANCOVA was conducted using the 
Personal Space item as a covariate. This analysis is a preliminary way to test for 
potential mediation by partialling out its effects and determining if the interaction 
becomes non-significant (Fiske, Kenny, & Taylor, 1982).   This still yielded a 
significant result indicating Personal Space is not likely a mediator, 
F(2,216)=4.812, p=.009. To investigate privacy violation as a potential mediator, 
a maximum likelihood factor analysis with promax rotation of the remaining 
questions 5, and 7-14 (see Appendix B) was conducted, from which two factors 
emerged. However, four of the items had communalities below 0.4 suggesting 
they may not be related to the other items (Costello & Osborne, 2005) and this 
analysis only explained 65% of the total variance, therefor these four items were 
excluded and the analysis was repeated with questions 5, 8, 11, 12, and 14 from 
which two factors emerged (See Table 1 for structure matrix) this time explaining 
76.05% of the variance. The first factor included items related to privacy 
violations and the second included items related to effectiveness so these were 
converted into standardized factor scores and labeled Privacy and Effectiveness. 
The two factors were negatively correlated, (-.509) indicating that as perceived 
privacy violation increases, perceived effectiveness decreases.   
  16 
Table 1 
Structure Matrix for Privacy and Effectiveness 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
Will Reduce Crime (11) -.486 .984 
Will Help Catch Criminals (12) -.459 .848 
Will Violate Your Privacy (14) .943 -.449 
Will be Abused (8) .754 -.548 
Will Violate Suspect’s Privacy (5) .801 -.385 
 
A one-way ANCOVA using the Privacy factor score as a covariate yielded a non-
significant results, F(2,202)=1.313, p=.271, indicating this could be a potential 
mediator. This analysis was repeated using the Effectiveness factor score as the 
covariate and once again a non-significant result was found, F(2,202)=2.421, 
p=.091, indicating it too could be a potential mediator. To further explore the 
effect of these two factors, a mediation analysis was conducted using PROCESS, 
which is a statistical tool designed to assess direct and indirect effects in models 
with multiple mediators (Hayes, 2012; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). To 
accommodate the categorical variable, Type, two dummy codes were created in 
order to compare GPS to Police, and Drones to Police with Support as the 
outcome variable. Results indicated that the difference in Support between GPS 
and Police was completely mediated by Privacy (Indirect effect on Support for 
GPS vs. Police through Privacy: ab=.1791, SEab=.0947, 95%CI:[.0015 
<ab<.3730]. Indirect effect on Support for GPS vs. Police through Effectiveness: 
ab=.1202, SEab=.0677, 95%CI:[-.0061 <ab<.2499]) (See Figure 1). The more 
  17 
participants viewed GPS as a privacy violation the less likely they were to support 
its use. The difference in Support between Drones and Police was completely 
mediated by both Privacy and Effectiveness (Indirect effect on Support for Police 
vs. Drones through Privacy: ab=.2982, SEab=.1037, 95%CI:[.0981 <ab<.5096]. 
Indirect effect on Support for Police vs. Drones through Effectiveness: ab=.1551, 
SEab=.0692, 95%CI:[.0183 <ab<.2997])(See Figure 2). The more participants felt  
Drone was a privacy violation and the more they felt it was not effective, the less 













Figure 1. Mediation model comparing Support for Police vs. GPS through 































Figure 2. Mediation model comparing Support for Police vs. Drones through 
Privacy and Effectiveness.  
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Discussion 1 
These results indicate that participants do differentially support these three 
modes of surveillance and are less supportive of using a GPS device to track 
suspects than using Police tailing. Further the results indicate that these 
differences in support are not mediated by perception that monitoring type might 
violate one’s personal space (as might be expected if trespassing were a concern). 
Instead,  it seems that support for one monitoring type over another is mediated 
by the extent to which a person thinks that it will violate privacy in general, which 
is more in line with Justice Sotomayor’s sentiment that privacy policies 
concerning certain types of surveillance should be based on protecting a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
It is important to acknowledge that this experiment was meant to serve as 
a starting point and did not address some important questions. The second 
experiment expands on the first by addressing underlying assumptions that might 
have influenced participants to be more supportive of one form of monitoring 
compared to another.  For example, the terms “GPS” and “Drone” may have 
negative connotation and/or preexisting expectation of the other capabilities of the 
technologies (beyond tracking vehicle location) so in experiment two these terms 
will be replaced with more ambiguous terminology. To investigate if abuse of the 
technology because of assumptions about low cost influences judgments of 
Support, the cost of implementing the monitoring type is manipulated in terms of 
costing more of less than existing surveillance techniques. To determine if 
  20 
assumptions about effectiveness might influence judgments of support, a criminal 
suspect’s ability to evade the monitoring type is  also manipulated. To address 
whether perceived personal-space violation is a complete measure of private-
space violation, an additional item measuring perceived physical-space violation 
is added.   
  21 
Chapter 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Using similar vignettes to the previous experiment, one of three forms of 
warrantless tracking technology (Type) is presented to participants. The cost 
(Cost)  to employ the each monitoring type and the effectiveness (Evade) of each 
monitoring type are also manipulated. The extent to which the participant would 
support the use of the monitoring type in their scenario will be used as the 
primary dependent variable. Potential mediation by private-space violation, 




Again using Amazon Mechanical Turk a demographically diverse sample 
of US residents, age 18 or older was recruited to participate in an online 
experiment2 in exchange for compensation of $1.00. Participants gained access to 
the research in the same manner as experiment one. A total of 398 responses were 
received. Because this experiment had two additional screens the cut off time was 
increased to 120 seconds, and the manipulation check was increased to four 
questions. A total of 77 response were excluded for failing either the time 
requirement, for receiving a score of two or less on manipulation check, or for 
excessive missing data. The final sample excluded 18.6% of the original sample 
                                                
2	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  not	  to	  complete	  the	  study	  if	  they	  had	  participated	  in	  a	  similar	  
study	  in	  the	  past.	  In	  addition,	  by	  comparing	  users’	  IP	  addresses	  and	  finding	  no	  duplication	  
between	  E1	  andE2,	  it	  was	  determined	  that	  it	  was	  unlikely	  that	  any	  participants	  completed	  both	  
experiments.	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leaving a total 324 participants of which 51.7%  were female, the mean age was 
31, and 44.9% held at least a four-year college degree.  
Materials and Procedure 
Using similar vignettes and instruction as in experiment one participants 
were presented with a scenario about the proposed use of a particular type of 
monitoring. Once again, three different forms of warrantless tracking technology 
(Type) were used, however, to avoid potential negative stereotypes the terms 
“GPS” and “Drone” were replaced by Electronic Tracking Device (Attached 
Device) and Remote Electronic Tracking (Unattached Device) respectively. These 
two forms of tracking were still described as covert forms of monitoring a 
suspect’s vehicle location; however, to maintain variability in the physical 
distance from the suspect and suspect’s vehicle, the Attached Device was 
described as being physically placed on the vehicle and the Unattached Device 
was described as being remotely located. This experiment also manipulated the 
cost of implementing the monitoring type (Cost) and a criminal suspect’s ability 
to evade the monitoring type (Evade). Thus, a 3(Type: Electronic Tracking 
Device, Remote Electronic Tracking, and Full-time police ) x 2(Cost: less 
expensive, more expensive) x2 (Evade: possible, not possible) between-subject 
design was conducted.  
Each participant, after being randomly assigned to one of these twelve 
conditions, was presented with a scenario informing them the “Association of 
Police Chiefs” was considering the use of a particular monitoring type to follow 
suspects and gather information that could lead to an arrest. This was followed by 
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a statement briefly describing the monitoring type and that information collected 
would be compared with other police information to identify possible illegal 
activities. This was followed by a statement that the monitoring type would be 
more or less costly than current methods available, and this was followed by a 
separate statement about whether it was possible or not for the suspects to evade 
the technology. Finally, each scenario concluded with a statement that the 
monitoring technology would be implemented in such a way that no search 
warrant would be needed to conduct this particular type of surveillance. A sample 
scenario and description for each condition is included as Appendix C.     
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate whether or 
not they would support the use of the monitoring technology if their state were to 
propose its implementation. Although in experiment one this dependent variable 
was dichotomous, which would correspond to traditional voting procedures, in 
this experiment a 7-point Likert scale was used to measure participants’ relative 
degree of support (with 1 being “would not support at all” and 7 being “would 
completely support”) to achieve a more precise measure of support. The general 
support question was followed by a similar set of randomly ordered questions as 
in experiment one related to effectiveness, privacy, and support (See Appendix B 
for list). On the next screen participants were presented with a four-item 
manipulation check to measure whether participants had attended to the 
information presented in the scenario. Finally, demographic information was 
collected and participants were directed back to AMT to receive their 
compensation. 
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Results 
To create the primary dependent variable, a maximum likelihood factor 
analysis was performed using the same four support questions that were used in 
experiment one (see Appendix B) from which a single factor emerged, explaining 
83.63% of the total variance. The items were converted into a standardized factor 
score, which was labeled Support. Subsequently, a 3(Type: Attached Device, 
Unattached Device, and Full-time police ) x 2(Cost: less expensive, more 
expensive) x2 (Evade: possible, not possible) between-subject ANOVA on 
Support was used to test for main effects and interactions of Type, Cost, and 
Evade. Interestingly, there were no main effects of Type (p=.137), Cost (p=.779), 
or Evade (p=.238). There were no significant interactions found  between Type 
and Evade, Evade and Cost, or Evade, Cost, and Type, however there was a 
marginally significant interaction of Type and Cost. F(2,309)=2.544, p=.080, 
η2=.016 (see Figure 3).  
In order to investigate this potential interaction, simple effects test were 
conducted to look at Cost within each Type on Support. Within the Attached 
Device condition, participants showed marginally more Support for the use of the 
more expensive Attached Device  compared to the less expensive Attached 
Device (p=.109, M=.224, M=.112). In contrast, within the Police condition, 
participants showed marginally more Support for less expensive Police over more 
expensive Police (p=.112, M=-.051, M=.230). Within the Unattached Device 
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condition Support did not significantly differ between the less expensive and 
more expensive conditions (p=.493).  
 
 
Figure 3. Weak interaction of Type by Cost on Support (p=.08). 
 
To look for a potential explanation for this weak interaction the follow-up 
questions were examined as potential mediators of the interaction effect. Scores 
measuring private-space violations were first examined by conducting a set of 
3(Type: Attached Device, Unattached Device, and Full-time police ) x 2(Cost: 
less expensive, more expensive) x2 (Evade: possible, not possible) between-
subject ANCOVAs, the first using the item measuring physical space violation as 
a covariate and the second using the item measuring personal space violation as a 
covariate.  The Type x Cost interaction was no longer significant when Physical 
Space (p=.226) was included as a covariate, indicating potential mediation. The 
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interaction was also no longer significant when Personal Space (p=.270) was 
included as covariates, also indicating potential mediation. We continued by 
examining the item that asked participants if they felt their monitoring type would 
be used to often. Once again a 3(Type: Attached Device, Unattached Device, and 
Full-time police ) x 2(Cost: less expensive, more expensive) x2 (Evade: possible, 
not possible) between-subject ANCOVA was conducted with Used to Often as a 
covariate. In this analysis the interaction between Type and Cost remained weakly 
significant (p=.093) indicating participant responses on this item was not likely 
mediating the Type by Cost interaction. Subsequently, as in experiment one, to 
investigate whether privacy or effectiveness mediated this relationship a 
maximum likelihood factor analysis with promax rotation was performed using 
questions 5,7, and 9-14 (see Appendix B), from which two factors emerged. 
However, three items had communalities below 0.4 and the analysis only 
explained 53% of the total variance, therefor these three items were excluded and 
the analysis was repeated with questions 5, 10, 11, 12, and 14. Once again two 
factors emerged, this time explaining 73.89% of the total variance. The items 
loaded into factors in a similar fashion as experiment one and were also 
negatively correlated (-.422). Two standardized factor scores were created and 
labeled Privacy and Effectiveness. In two subsequent ANCOVA’s, the Privacy 
factor score was entered as a covariate as was the Effectiveness factor score. The 
weak interaction of Type by Cost remained when Effectiveness was used as a 
covariate (p=.065),indicating this factor is not likely a mediator, however the 
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interaction was no longer significant when the Privacy factor was included as 
covariate (p=.603), implicating it as a potential mediator of this interaction. 
 
Table 2 
Structure Matrix for Privacy and Effectiveness  
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
Will Reduce Crime (11) -.383 .930 
Will Catch Criminals (12) -.332 .737 
Violates Suspect’s Privacy (5) .939 -.386 
Violates Your Privacy (14) .873 -.367 
Provides Too Much Info (10) .800 -.364 
 
Discussion 2 
Results from experiment two indicate that differential support for each 
monitoring technique may be effected when the monitoring type is described in 
terms that may prevent participants from immediately accessing existing 
stereotypes. These findings could be significant to decision makers when 
comparing existing and emerging technology that are functionally similar, but 
may carry significantly different public perceptions. These results also revealed 
an interesting interaction between monitoring Type and Cost, specifically when 
comparing support for the use of an Attached device and Police tailing. 
Participants were more supportive of the “more expensive” Attached Device than 
the “less expensive” one, but the opposite was true of using Police tailing 
(participants were more supportive of “less expensive” Police tailing). This 
interaction was mediated by perceptions of private-space violation and general 
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privacy violation which would suggest that, both precedents addressed in United 
State v Jones, (trespass and reasonable expectation of privacy) mediate public 
decision of support for this interaction.  




Experiment one suggest that the public’s intuitive decisions about support 
for the use of GPS devices without a search warrant are congruent with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in United v. Jones (2012) that covertly tracking a suspect 
using a GPS device without a search warrant is unlawful. However, in this case 
the extent to which participants were less supportive of using the GPS device (and 
more supportive of Police tailing) was mediated by the extent to which the 
monitoring type was perceived to be a threat to general privacy and was not 
mediated by perceived threats to private-space. This indicates that, based on their 
instinctive knowledge of the technology, the public is less supportive of GPS 
devices for a different reason than that of the majority opinion indicating that GPS 
tracking is a violation of the Fourth Amendment on the grounds that placement of 
the device constitutes trespassing (United States v. Jones). While experiment one 
provides evidence that the public does differentially support monitoring types that 
purportedly collect similar information, experiment two, which was designed to 
strip away and control for preconceptions about the technologies, demonstrated 
that without the extra baggage associated with the terms “GPS” and “Drone” the 
public may not necessarily exercise differential support for these monitoring 
types.  
To understand these findings it is necessary to look more closely at the 
design and results of each experiment. In the first experiment participants were 
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ask to make judgments about technologies that they have most likely seen or 
heard about in a variety of media outlets, as such the terms GPS and Drone 
arguably come to the table with preexisting connotations in terms of their use by 
law enforcement. For example drones have traditionally been used by the military 
in combat zones which could evoke a negative stereotype, and a GPS receiver is 
so regularly included as a component in other more sophisticated devices (such as 
cell phones) it may be difficult for participants to disassociate all of these other 
functions from simple location tracking, potential evoking the intuition that a GPS 
device may gather too much information (Maass & Rajagopalan, 2012). 
Nonetheless, it is important to know if and how these baseline or intuitive 
decision influence support and perceived privacy violations because, in the “real 
world”, this is generally what public participation in policy decision will be 
guided by. Experiment one examined what mediates these intuitive measures of 
support, which, again are important to acknowledge and investigate, but 
experiment two demonstrates that these mechanisms are not necessarily the same 
when these preconceptions are removed.  
In the first experiment we find that participants’ differential support for 
the three monitoring types was mediated by the extent to which the monitoring 
type was perceived to be a threat to overall privacy. However, these perceptions 
of potential privacy violations could be influence by a number of pre-existing, 
mainstream notions about each monitoring type. Overuse of a technology could 
arguably be a proxy for increased potential to violate privacy, and the low cost 
and simplicity of a GPS device (a concern, as mentioned earlier, that was 
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articulated by Justice Sotomayor in the United States v Jones, 2012) could make it 
prone to assumptions that it would be overused. Preconceptions about the 
effectiveness may also influence perceptions of potential privacy violations, for 
example, if one particular type of technology is generally thought to be much 
more effective than another, an assumption that law enforcement would want to 
use the new technology much more often than the other types could also increase 
the perception of potential privacy violation by that monitoring type. In fact, the 
difference in perceived effectiveness between Drones and Police tailing is 
mediated by perceptions of potential privacy violations and perceived 
effectiveness. This could be due in part to the possibility that people are less sure 
of what to expect from drones in terms of privacy violation and therefor also rely 
on perceptions effectiveness to guide decision about support.  
When, in experiment two, we substitute the terms “GPS” and “Drone” 
with terms that are more generic, but maintain the essential features of each, 
indicate how each would be used, and state what type of information they would 
monitor, we see marked differences in terms of differential support and 
mediation. Both devices were described as covertly collecting information about 
the vehicle location during a specific time, but one purportedly attaches to the 
vehicle (like a GPS), while the other collects the information remotely without 
touching the car (like a Drone). Without altering the Police description and by 
ostensibly removing most preconceptions about “GPS” and “Drone”, the three 
monitoring types are no longer differentially support strictly by Type.  
In addition to the absence of differential support for each monitoring 
  32 
Type, these results also indicate that participants didn’t base decision of support 
solely on the cost, nor did they base support decisions on the ability for suspects 
to evade the technology. However, there was an interesting interaction between 
the monitoring type and the relative cost of implementing it. Participants were 
more supportive of the “more expensive” Attached Device than the less expensive 
one. On the other hand participants were actually more in favor of the “less 
expensive”, Police tailing than the “more expensive” Police tailing. The 
interaction was unremarkably in the case of the Unattached Device. One 
explanation for this Type by Cost interaction could be that participants believe 
more expensive Attached Devices would be used less often, posing of lower 
threat of privacy violation, thereby garnishing more support. At the same, the 
more expensive police officers might be perceived as being more motivated to 
uncover information than regular police officer, posing a greater threat of privacy 
violation and garnishing less support. If this were the case, however, we would 
have expected to see mediation by items that measured whether participants felt 
the monitoring type would be used often and/or if it would be effective, but 
neither of these factors showed signs of significant mediation. Two interesting 
factors did mediate this Type by Cost interaction: Private-space violation and 
general privacy violation, which brings the discussion back to United States v 
Jones.  
The conflicting opinions from Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor about 
which Fourth Amendment precedent is more significant in determining how GPS 
surveillance threatens privacy, trespassing or violation of reasonable expectation 
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of privacy, may reflect the public’s more complex underlying concerns about 
determining privacy violations. This would certainly be consistent with the 
fundamental role we expect the Supreme Court to play in our society. In which 
case, they both got it exactly right.  
Recommendations  
The research presented here is meant to initiate a strangely absent dialogue 
about the psychological nature of privacy. Certainly not a comprehensive 
examination of the mechanism guiding perceptions of privacy, it does highlight 
the complexities of experimentally examining privacy. Just as the study of 
morality found its footing in experimental research only after centuries of 
extensive legal and philosophical examination, it seems the time has come for 
privacy to also move beyond parenthetical lists of things that should or should not 
be protected and now be examined in terms of its social psychological roots and 
the mechanism by which it operates. Unless the essential principles of privacy can 
be experimentally defined it will remain unclear if the nature of privacy is 
changing with the emergence of new technologies or if there are indeed 
predictable and fixed rules that govern perceptions of privacy. Future research in 
this area should focus on investigating other potential mediators that might 
influence perceptions of privacy and private-space that would potentially lead to 
differential support for monitoring and surveillance techniques -not only those 
used by government agencies, but also those used by private organization. These 
factors might include manipulating the duration of the surveillance, manipulating 
the type of inferences that could be made about a person’s identity by monitoring 
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type, manipulating who is collecting the information, manipulating the perceived 
benefits of collecting the information, and manipulating the amount of control a 
person has over the information. Progress in this area of research could help 
technology developers understand the impact that new information gathering 
technologies could have on human interests and could help guide governing 
bodies to get ahead of decision that impact privacy protection.  
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APPENDIX A  
EXPERIMENT 1 – SCENARIO 
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Imagine that the Association of Police Chiefs is considering using [Type]* 
to follow suspects in order to obtain information that could lead to an arrest. 
[Type description]** to gather information about the vehicle’s location 
during a particular period of time. Police departments can then compare this 
information with suspected criminal activity to determine any patterns of 
possible illegal activity. This technique would be implemented in such a 
way that no search warrant is needed for the police departments to conduct 
this type of surveillance, as it does not constitute a traditional search. 
GPS condition 
*…global positioning system (GPS) devices… 
**A GPS device is covertly placed under a suspect’s car… 
Drone condition 
*…drones…  
** A drone is a small unmanned plane that covertly tracks a suspect from 
the air and is used… 
Police Condition 
* …full-time police officers… 
**Police officers would covertly follow suspects in undercover cars… 
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APPENDIX B  
QUESTIONS - EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2 
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1. If your state proposed this type of monitoring would you support it? 
Follow-up questions presented in random order: 
2. To what extent do you think that this type of monitoring seems 
reasonable? 
3. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring should be 
legally permissible? 
4. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring is a good 
idea? 
5. To what extent do you believe that being monitored in this way would 
constitute a violation of the suspect's privacy? 
6. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would be a 
violation of the suspect’s personal space? 
7. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would be 
used often by police departments? 
8. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would be 
abused?* 
9. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would pose a 
risk to bystanders? 
10. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would 
provide too many details about a person? 
11. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would help 
the police departments reduce crime? 
12. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would help 
catch/apprehend criminals? 
13. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring will not 
provide enough information about a person? 
14. To what extent do you believe that being monitored in this way would 
constitute a violation of your privacy? 
15. To what extent do you believe that this type of monitoring would be a 
violation of the suspect’s physical space?** 
*Only appeared in question list for E1 




APPENDIX C  




The Association of Police Chiefs is considering using [Type]* to follow 
suspects in order to obtain information that could lead to an arrest. [Type 
description]** gather information about the vehicle’s location during a 
particular period of time. Police departments can then compare this 
information with suspected criminal activity to determine any patterns of 
possible illegal activity. This method is relatively [Cost]* and would cost 
police departments [Cost description]** than the current methods available. 
[Type]* are highly effective, [Evade]* this type of tracking. This technology 
would be implemented in such a way that no search warrant is needed for the 
police departments to conduct this type of surveillance, as it does not 
constitute a traditional search. 
Type Manipulation (3) 
Attached:  
*Electronic Tracking Devices (ETD)  
**An ETD is covertly placed under a suspect’s car and is used to 
Unattached: 
*Remote Tracking Device (RTD) 
**An RET device can remotely track a suspect’s car without 
attaching anything to the vehicle and is used to 
Police: 
*full-time police officers 











*but it is possible for a suspect to evade  
Not Possible 
*and it is not possible for a suspect to evade 
 
